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Note
CAN A CALIFORNIA LITIGANT PREVAIL IN
AN ACTION FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE
BASED ON AN ATTORNEY’S ORAL
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE  UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT?
KRISTA M. ENNS
I have eaten the plums that were in the icebox and which you were
probably saving for breakfast. Forgive me they were delicious so
sweet and so cold.1
INTRODUCTION
One can only hope that this poem allowed a potential dispute
over plums to be settled more peacefully than the dispute over plums
that gave rise to a legal malpractice suit now pending in a California
trial court. The lawsuit Campagne & Assocs. v. Gerawan Farming,
Inc.2 stems from the oral argument presented to the Supreme Court
in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott (Wileman).3 Wileman Broth-
ers and Elliott, Inc. (Wileman), filed suit in 1988, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(AMAA).4 An Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Ag-
riculture held for Wileman,5 but was reversed by a USDA Judicial
Officer.6 Subsequently, fifteen other litigants, including Gerawan
1. WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, This Is Just to Say, in 1 THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS 372, 372 (A. Walton Litz & Christopher MacGowan eds., 1986).
2. No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 25, 1997).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
4. 50 Stat. 246, 246-49 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); see Wile-
man Bros. & Elliot, 52 Agric. Dec. 5, 7-8 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
5. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 50 Agric. Dec. 1165, 1171 (1991).
6. See Wileman, 52 Agric. Dec. at 41 n.36.
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Farming, Inc. (Gerawan), joined Wileman in the suit.7 The Eastern
District of California upheld the Judicial Officer’s holding, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the challenged provisions of the
AMAA unconstitutional. In 1995, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether the provision of the Act that provides for
mandatory assessments for generic advertising of California peaches,
nectarines, and plums was constitutional.8
Until the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, the lead attor-
ney for Wileman et al., was Thomas A. Campagne, a generalist with a
small practice in Fresno, California.9 After certiorari was granted,
however, Gerawan retained a separate attorney, Michael W. McCon-
nell, a specialist in both First Amendment issues and oral argument
before the Supreme Court.10 Gerawan insisted that Campagne step
aside and let McConnell write the brief for the respondents and pres-
ent the oral argument to the Court.11 Notwithstanding strenuous pres-
sure from thirteen of the sixteen respondents, Campagne refused
Gerawan’s request12 and ultimately presented the oral argument him-
self.13 After the oral argument, the Supreme Court ruled against the
respondents and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory as-
sessments for generic advertisements.14
7. See Wileman, 52 Agric. Dec. at 5.
8. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 517 U.S. 1232 (1996). Congress passed the
AMAA to “establish and maintain . . . orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodi-
ties in interstate commerce.” 7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (1994). The Act covers various commodities,
including California peaches, nectarines and plums. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 608(c)(6)(I) (1994).
One program under the marketing order is the production of generic advertising to increase
demand for the covered commodities. See 7 U.S.C. § 610(c)(6)(I) (1994). To pay for these pro-
grams, including the advertisements, handlers of the commodities covered by the Act are as-
sessed mandatory fees based on the volume of the commodity that each ships. See 7 U.S.C. §
610(b)(2)(ii) (1994). Generic advertising was extended to plums and nectarines in 1965, see Act
of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-330, § 1(b), 79 Stat. 1270, 1270, and to peaches in 1971, see Act
of Aug. 13, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-120, 85 Stat. 340, 340.
9. See Martindale-Hubbell, Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Locator (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://lawyers.martindale.com/marhub/firm?_firm-no=749828001>.
10. See Letter from Dan Gerawan, Gerawan Farming, Inc., to Thomas Campagne, Law
Firm of Thomas Campagne & Assocs. 2-3 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Gerawan Letter I] (on
file with Duke Law Journal).
11. See id. at 2.
12. See Letter from Thomas Campagne, Law Firm of Thomas Campagne & Assocs., to
Chiamori Farms, Inc., Kobashi Farms, Inc., Tange Bros., Inc., Nagao Farms, Chosen Enter-
prises, Kobashi Farms, Nakayama Farms, Inc., and Mihara Farms 3 (Nov. 11, 1996)
[hereinafter Campagne Letter] (on file with Duke Law Journal).
13. See Jerry Bier, Allies in Marketing-Order Case Locked in Dispute, FRESNO BEE, June
29, 1997, at B1.
14. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2142 (1997).
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Debates about the benefits litigants receive from retaining spe-
cialists have been primarily academic.15 However, the events under-
lying Wileman bring the discussion from the classroom to the court-
room. After the oral argument, Gerawan filed a malpractice action in
California state court against Campagne,16 alleging that Campagne’s
oral argument was deficient.17 Specifically, Gerawan posited that
since Campagne had little previous First Amendment experience and
no Supreme Court experience, Campagne had a duty to associate
withor at least consulta Supreme Court specialist.18
Since Wileman was a Supreme Court decision, a legal malprac-
tice claim creates an interesting possibility: to rule in Gerawan’s fa-
vor, the trial court necessarily must hold that the Supreme Court
should have decided Wileman differently.19 If the trial court comes to
this conclusion, issues of res judicata and federalism appear to be im-
plicated.20 However, to reach those issues, it must first be decided
whether Gerawan or similarly situated litigants can prevail.
This Note uses Campagne to evaluate whether a litigant can re-
cover for damages that allegedly occurred during oral argument be-
fore the Supreme Court. Part I of this Note identifies the terms
“specialist” and “Supreme Court specialist” to provide background
for Gerawan’s charge. Part II sets the stage for Campagne, the mal-
practice suit filed by Gerawan. It begins by discussing the genesis of
Wileman, its journey through the court system, and its resolution by
the Supreme Court. The Part concludes with a review of the Cam-
pagne court’s initial determination that failure to associate with, or
15. See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.4, at
559-60 (4th ed. 1996).
16. See Mark Thompson, How to Grow Lawsuits: Oral Arguments Land Lawyer Back in
Court, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1998, at 23.
17. See First Amended Cross-Complaint at 11-12, Campagne & Assocs. v. Gerawan
Farming, Inc., No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998).
18. See id. at 14.
19. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 32.1, at 128.
20. If Gerawan prevails, it will have apparently bootstrapped an appeal of the United
States Supreme Court via a legal malpractice action. When the Court denied the petitions to
rehear Wileman, the First Amendment issue was resolved definitively. Giving Gerawan relief,
however, gives the appearance of allowing the trial court to review and reverse Wileman.  At
least one court, the Supreme Court of Utah, has warned against using legal malpractice actions
to bootstrap in other contexts. See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 440 (Utah 1996) (“We see
no reason why a malpractice plaintiff should be able to bootstrap his way into having a lay jury
decide the merits of the underlying ‘suit within a suit’ when, by statute or other rule of law, only
an expert judge could have made the underlying decision.”).
ENNS EXECUTIVE EDIT2.DOC 12/09/98  7:46 AM
114 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:111
professionally consult, a specialist can be the basis for a legal mal-
practice action.
In Part III, Gerawan’s charge is examined in the context of Cali-
fornia’s legal malpractice doctrine. In California, a legal malpractice
action for negligence mirrors any other cause of action for negligence
in that it has four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach (a negligent act or
omission); (3) causation; and (4) damages.21 To prevail on a legal
malpractice claim, the plaintiff must conduct what is termed a “trial-
within-a-trial.”22 That is, not only must the client prove that her at-
torney was negligent, the client must relitigate the underlying claim
to prove that, but for the attorney’s negligence, the outcome of the
case would have been different.23 Moreover, when a client alleges her
attorney caused an adverse decision, the client must allege with speci-
ficity the particular issue(s) on which the attorney erred.24 Gerawan
has identified four issues from Campagne’s oral argument that a Su-
preme Court specialist would have argued differently.25 Part III
evaluates Gerawan’s chances of proving causation with respect to
each of the four issues it has identified. It argues that although Ger-
awan can prove duty, breach, and damages, it will not be able to
prove causation, and therefore will not prevail in its suit.
Part IV acknowledges the tension between the difficulty of
proving causation in legal malpractice actions and one of the goals of
legal malpractice, which is to allow litigants recovery when their at-
torneys are negligent. The part then considers the “loss of chance”
doctrine, which is used in medical malpractice cases, as a possible al-
ternative to the rigorous “but for” causation requirement in legal
malpractice. Since a shift away from the “but for” standard is likely
to cause more problems than it solves, and because adequate protec-
tions already exist for litigants, Part IV argues that the current causa-
tion requirements should be maintained for litigants who allege that
they suffered an injury during Supreme Court oral argument.
21. See Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton, 55 Cal. App. 4th 853, 863 (Ct. App. 1997).
22. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 820, 832 (Ct. App.
1997).
23. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 32.1, at 128.
24. See 3 id. § 29.41, at 772 (“In presenting the underlying appeal in the subsequent legal
malpractice action, the parties must specify the issues that should have been urged in the un-
derlying action.”).
25. See infra pages 32-37.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF SPECIALIZATION AND THE “SUPREME COURT
SPECIALIST”
To analyze a cause of action for “failure to associate with or pro-
fessionally consult a specialist” in the context of Campagne v. Ger-
awan, the terms “specialist” and “Supreme Court specialist” must
first be discussed. The emergence of specialization in Supreme Court
practice followed the industry-wide movement in the legal profession
toward specialization.26 As early as 1910, attorneys began to specialize
in certain fields of law.27 By 1950, legal specialization had become so
prevalent that members of the American Bar Association (ABA) be-
gan debating whether to formally recognize specialties.28 Over the
next twenty years, the ABA created several committees to study the
issue.29 In 1969, the ABA reserved judgment on the issue of a national
plan of specialization pending results of experimental specialization
programs at the state and local levels.30 Four years later, California
became the first state to establish a specialty certification, and Texas
followed shortly thereafter.31 Currently, twenty-one states formally
recognize specialties.32 Even in the twenty-nine states where speciali-
zation is not formally recognized, it still exists. 33
26. See generally Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45
S.C. L. REV. 1003, 1015-54 (1994) (discussing the history of specialization from 1870-1969); Ju-
dith Kilpatrick, Specialist Certification for Lawyers: What Is Going On?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.
273, 275-90 (1997) (describing various efforts to win recognition for specialization).
27. See Ariens, supra note 26, at 1027-28 (citing corporate law as one of the first recog-
nized fields of specialization).
28. See id. at 1042.
29. See id. at 1042-54. In 1953, the ABA created the Special Committee on Specialization
and Specialized Legal Education to determine whether the ABA should create a permanent
committee to regulate specialization. See id. at 1043. Although the Special Committee recom-
mended that the ABA do so, the recommendation was rejected in 1954. See id. In 1967, the
Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services concluded that “[r]ecognition and regula-
tion of specialization in the practice of law [would] measurably improve the availability of legal
services,” id. at 1053, prompting the creation of another committee, the Special Committee on
Specialization,  see id. at 1053-54.
30. See id. at 1054.
31. See id. Each selected three fields for certification: California chose workmen’s com-
pensation, criminal law, and taxation; Texas opted for family law, criminal law, and labor law.
See id.
32. See Kilpatrick, supra note 26, at 289 (“As of 1995, twenty-nine states still had no provi-
sion, active or inactive, for formal recognition of specialists.”).
33. See Ariens, supra note 26, at 1005 (“It is the lawyer’s expertise . . . not the lawyer’s
degree in law or licensure by the state, that permits the lawyer to claim the mantle of profes-
sional.”). Ariens also argues that Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, 496
U.S. 91 (1990), effectively ended bar-controlled certification of specialists. See Ariens, supra
note 27, at 1005. The rationale behind this argument is that in Peel the Court held that a state
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One area in which attorneys have specialized, though the spe-
cialty has not received formal recognition, is the Supreme Court
practice. The existence of Supreme Court specialists can be traced to
the beginning of the nineteenth century. At that time, very few attor-
neys argued before the Supreme Court.34 Throughout the Marshall
era (1801-1835), appearance before the Court was dominated by an
elite group of attorneys.35 However, there was a hiatus in such spe-
cialization until the latter part of the twentieth century.36 After the
Civil War and through the twentieth century, this insular group was
replaced by a “more fluid” set of attorneys.37 The fluidity became so
pronounced that most attorneys who appeared before the Supreme
Court were characterized as “once-in-a-lifetime lawyers.”38 During
the 1980s, however, practice before the Supreme Court began to be
comprised, once again, of a select group.39
This latter group of attorneys who began to specialize in Su-
preme Court practice did so in response to three specific develop-
ments of the 1980s: (1) a change in the conduct of the Supreme Court
Justices at oral argument, which demanded more diligent prepara-
tion; (2) statements made by Supreme Court Justices outside of the
courtroom which suggested that more experienced advocates were
preferred; and (3) the proliferation of legal services in Washington,
D.C., which required law firms to distinguish themselves to remain
competitive.
Changes in the Justices’ conduct at oral argument began to be
noticed in the middle of the 1980s. Prior to the 1980s, the Court was a
much quieter place: “Most of the justices were 75 years of age or
older and quite content to listen to the arguments.”40 After 1983,
however, the Justices became more active in their questioning of liti-
gants.41 For example, Justices White, Stevens and O’Connor began to
may not prohibit non-misleading advertisement of an attorney’s specialist certification by an
unapproved certification board. See id. Since an approved certification board is no longer re-
quired, the bar can no longer monitor specialization.
34. See KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 12 (1993).
35. See 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 202 (1988).
36. See MCGUIRE, supra note 34, at 12.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Kathleen Sylvester, Gearing Up to Sway the Justices, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, 10.
39. See MCGUIRE, supra note 36, at 21.
40. David G. Savage, Say the Right Thing, 83 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 54, 55.
41. See id.
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interject during oral arguments on a regular basis.42 Although the ac-
tual date corresponding to the end of the “quiet” Court and start of
the “hot” court is subject to debate,43 by the time Wileman was ar-
gued, participation by the Justices during oral arguments was the rule
rather than the exception.44 Consequently, oral arguments at the Su-
preme Court are no longer limited to recitations of prepared text.
The Supreme Court Justices are notorious for their complex hypo-
theticals, requests for concessions, and frequent questions.45
The second factor that sparked specialization was out-of-Court
commentary by several of the Justices. This commentary indicated
that the Court desired more experienced attorneys who prepared
more thoroughly for oral argument. For instance, in a presentation at
Georgetown University in 1983, Chief Justice Warren Burger dis-
cussed the importance he placed on litigants having “experienced”
and “qualified” attorneys conduct the oral argument.46 The same
year, at Mercer University Law School, then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist emphasized the weight that the Supreme Court Justices
place on oral arguments. He observed: “Oral advocacy is probably
more important in the Supreme Court of the United States than in
most other appellate courts. . . . The opportunity to convince [the Jus-
tices] of the merits of your position is at its highpoint.”47 In addition
to these explicit statements, some have found the Court’s preference
42. See id.
43. Several commentators argue that 1986 is the watershed year for the change in the
Court. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 14
(1996); Savage, supra note 40, at 55. However, they disagree about the reason for the change.
Compare SCHWARTZ, supra, at 14 (suggesting that the advent of the Rehnquist Court in 1986
was the precipitating factor for more active questioning), with Savage, supra note 40, at 55
(attributing the change to the fact that Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986).
44. See Savage, supra note 40, at 54. On today’s Court, only Justice Thomas consistently
refrains from asking questions. See id. at 55.
45. See Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States, 33
CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 535 (1984) (“[N]early every oral argument is punctuated with intense
questioning, [and] the argument is not under counsel’s complete control.”); David Segal, Sur-
vival in the Lions’ Den; Supreme Court Specialists Face Extraordinary Pressure for Huge Re-
wards. And Bruce Ennis Is on a Roll . . ., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1997, at F12 (characterizing oral
argument before the Court as a “free-for-all grilling”). This has led to attorneys referring to the
High Court as a “hot” court. Sylvester, supra note 38, at 1.
46. Warren E. Burger, Opening Remarks at the Conference on Supreme Court Advocacy
(Oct. 17, 1983) (discussing efforts to improve the quality of advocacy before the Court and em-
phasizing that the Court does not favor divided arguments, reliance on prepared text during
arguments, or longwinded arguments), in 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 525-27 (1984).
47. William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, Brainerd Currie Memo-
rial Lecture (Oct. 20, 1983), in 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1027-28 (1983-84).
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for experienced attorneys evinced in the Rules of the Supreme Court.
For example, Professor David O’Brien argues that the 1990 altera-
tion of Rule 38 to read “[t]he Court looks with disfavor on any oral
argument that is read from a prepared text,”48 was a signal to both
litigants and attorneys that the Court was frustrated with the quality
of attorneys’ oral advocacy.49
The proliferation of attorneys in Washington, D.C., also contrib-
uted to the emergence of a Supreme Court specialty. Between 1972
and 1983, membership in the Washington, D.C. bar more than tri-
pled.50 To compete in the expanded legal market, firms in Washing-
ton, D.C., like firms across the nation, began to distinguish them-
selves by creating “specialty” practice groups, including Supreme
Court specialty practice groups. 51
Stephen M. Shapiro established the first modern Supreme Court
specialty practice in 1983 at the D.C. office of the Chicago-based law
firm of Mayer, Platt and Brown (Mayer).52 A second firm introduced
a Supreme Court practice shortly thereafter,53 and by 1997, twenty-
48. SUP. CT. R. 28 (1990) (amending SUP. CT. R. 38 (1980)). The current version of the
rule states: “Oral argument read from prepared text is not favored.” SUP. CT. R. 28 (1998).
49. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 277-80 (4th ed. 1996).
50. See JEFFERY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 25 (1997).
51. See Kilpatrick, supra note 26, at 285-87.
52. See Arthur S. Hayes, Supreme Court Specialty: Does It Work?, AM. LAW., June 1989,
at 65, 65. Although Mayer had a small Supreme Court practice in 1951, the practice began to
expand significantly in 1983. See Steve France, Takeover Specialists: Why Many Litigators
Hand Their Cases to High Court Pros, 84 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 38, 39.  Shapiro recalled that
the idea for expanding the Supreme Court practice arose when he was the Deputy Solicitor
General in charge of business litigation from 1981-83. See id. While reviewing cases, he began
to believe that “[t]here was a significant number of cases where clients weren’t getting top-
notch representation.” Id.  It is interesting to note that Shapiro was a presenter at the confer-
ence at which Chief Justice Burger made his comments regarding unqualified attorneys ap-
pearing before the High Court. See Burger, supra note 46, at 525; Shapiro, supra note 45, at
529. After leaving the Solicitor General’s office, Shapiro began Mayer’s Supreme Court prac-
tice in 1983. See Hayes, supra, at 65. To build the base of its Supreme Court practice, Mayer
drew heavily on Solicitor General alumni. In 1986, Shapiro persuaded three other veterans of
the Solicitor General’s office to join him: Deputy Solicitor General Andrew L. Frey (a 14-year
veteran), Kenneth S. Geller, who oversaw civil litigation (a 10-year veteran) and Senior Assis-
tant Solicitor General Kathryn Oberly (a 12-year veteran). See Talking Points; Top-Level
Turnover at Solicitor’s Office, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1986, at A17. In 1989, Mayer added three
other Solicitor General alumni: Michael McConnell, Roy Englert, and Michael Kellogg. See
Hayes, supra, at 65.
53. In 1985, Sidley and Austin (Sidley), began its Supreme Court practice at its D.C. of-
fice. See Marcia Coyle, High Court Bar’s “Inner Circle,” NAT’L L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at A1. Carter
G. Phillips, who clerked at the Supreme Court and served as an assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral, and former Solicitor General Rex E. Lee started Sidley’s practice. See id.
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two firms nationwide advertised a Supreme Court specialty.54 Some
of these firms have rather large teams of Supreme Court specialists55
and actively recruit attorneys for the teams.56
Based on cases that appeared before the Court from 1977 to
1982, Professor Kevin McGuire found data suggesting that lawyers
with previous experience before the Court prevail “substantially
more often.”57 Data from the Solicitor General’s office also support
this theory. Members of the Solicitor General’s legal team are, in es-
sence, specialists—they only represent the United States in appellate
work before the Supreme Court and a few other federal courts.58 In
the 1991-92 Term, the outcome in Supreme Court cases urged by
these specialists prevailed more than 70 percent of the time.59
Thus, a litigant such as Gerawan can make a strong case that de
facto specialization has occurred throughout the legal profession, and
that Supreme Court practice is an area in which such specialization
exists. This, therefore, provides a foundation for Gerawan’s allega-
tion that failure to associate with or professionally consult a Supreme
Court specialist is actionable legal malpractice.
54. See Segal, supra note 45, at F12 (citing Martindale-Hubbell).
55. For example, by 1989, Mayer’s Supreme Court and Appellate Litigation Practice
Group had 21 attorneys, including 14 partners. See Hayes, supra note 52, at 65.
56. As illustrated by Mayer and Sidley, one source from which firms draw attorneys for a
Supreme Court practice is the Solicitor General’s office. See supra notes 52-53 and accompa-
nying text. A second source is former Supreme Court law clerks. In 1998, Sidley had about 20
former clerks working on its Supreme Court team. See France, supra note 52, at 38. In 1990,
firms paid signing bonuses as high as $35,000 to former clerks. See Eleanor Kerlow, Supreme
Court Payoff for Clerks: $35,000 Bonus; In Souring Economy, Firms Sweeten Pot to Lure Elite
Talent, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 1. Firms also resort to other aggressive tactics to recruit
clerks. For example, Latham and Watkins in Los Angeles telephoned every clerk at the Court
during the 1988-89 Term. See id. However, firms who choose to build their practice with former
clerks face certain limitations. No former clerk can participate in any professional capacity in
any case pending before the Court for two years. See SUP. CT. R. 7.
57. Kevin McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Law-
yers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 188 (1995) (finding that parties whose counsel had
more experience with the Supreme Court than the opposing counsel had a higher probability of
prevailing).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1994) (stating that, unless the Attorney General directs other-
wise, the Solicitor General and Attorney General handle cases for the United States in the Su-
preme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the United States
Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade).
59. See John G. Roberts Jr., Riding the Coattails of the Solicitor General, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 30.
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II. THE HISTORY OF CAMPAGNE V. GERAWAN
Until recently, the debate over the merits of specialization has
been predominantly academic.60 While courts have been careful not
to endorse either side in the argument about specialization,61 Cam-
pagne may force a judicial stance because Gerawan alleges that asso-
ciation or professional consultation with a Supreme Court specialist
should be mandatory, and that failure to associate with, or refer to, a
specialist is actionable legal malpractice.62
Gerawan claims that if Campagne had associated with or con-
sulted with a Supreme Court specialist for the oral argument in
Wileman the position advocated by Gerawan and the other respon-
dents would have prevailed.63
A. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott: The Underlying Case
Gerawan’s malpractice suit arose from a case heard before the
Supreme Court during the 1996-97 Term. Wileman began in 1988
when Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. and Kash Inc. (Kash), pro-
ducers of peaches, nectarines and plums in California’s San Joaquin
Valley, filed a suit against the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), which challenged the Agricultural Marketind Agree-
ment Act of 193764 on both constitutional65 and nonconstitutional66
60. Compare David R. Brink, Let’s Take Specialization Apart, 62 A.B.A. J. 191, 191
(1976) (arguing that even though specialists are compensated at a higher rate than generalists,
clients derive an economic benefit from specialization because specialists can work more effi-
ciently on complex issues within their fields and, therefore, bill fewer hours), and O. Randolph
Rollins, The Coming of Legal Specialization, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 479, 487 & nn.32-33 (1985)
(citing consumer-preference surveys from the 1970s and 1980s that indicate the public wants to
hire specialists), with Demetrios Dimitriou, The Individual Practitioner and Commercialism in
the Profession: How Can the Individual Survive?, 45 S.C. L. REV. 965, 968-69 (1994) (arguing
that “[a]s lawyers become more specialized, they tend to narrow their focus on the intricate and
intellectually fascinating legal issues involved in the client matter,” and that this myopia is ul-
timately detrimental to clients). See generally Kenneth J. Goldsmith, Specialty-Certification Ac-
creditation, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 34, 34 (setting forth both sides of the argument).
61. See, e.g., Moran v. Harris, 131 Cal. App. 3d 913, 921-22 (Ct. App. 1982) (maintaining a
neutral position, while acknowledging the argument that referral fees have the beneficial public
policy effect of providing an incentive to less capable lawyers to seek out experienced special-
ists to handle a case).
62. See Decision Denying Motion to Strike at 14-15, Campagne & Assocs. v. Gerawan
Farming, Inc., No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. decided Nov. 19, 1997).
63. See First Amended Cross-Complaint at 10-12, Campagne, No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998).
64. See Cindy Skrzycki, An Ad Campaign Fight That’s Ripe for the Picking, WASH. POST,
Dec. 13, 1996, at D1.
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grounds. In 1991, a USDA administrative law judge held for Wile-
man and Kash on the nonconstitutional challenges to the Act.67 Al-
though the holding did not address the constitutional issues,68 the
judge explained in dicta that Wileman and Kash would have pre-
vailed had the First Amendment issues been reached.69 The govern-
ment appealed,70 and in September 1991, a USDA judicial officer re-
versed the holding on the nonconstitutional issues and explicitly held
that the generic advertisement programs did not violate the First
Amendment.71
At the time the judicial officer decided Wileman, Gerawan and
other producers of peaches, plums and nectarines had pending claims
with similar First Amendment issues.72 Eventually, their suits were
consolidated with Wileman.73
65. Two constitutional grounds were alleged. First, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the
First Amendment. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 52 Agric. Dec. 5, 41 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (alleging
that the forced imposition of assessments for the purposes of generic advertising violated their
First Amendment rights because it forced association with their competitors and it forced them
to participate in a generic advertising program which was “contrary to their personal, profes-
sional, ideologic, philosophic and commercial beliefs”). Second, the plaintiffs alleged a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 46-47 (discussing allegations that plaintiffs were being
discriminated against because “advertising assessments are imposed on handlers of California
fruit, but not upon those who handle out-of-state or foreign fruit”).
66. The producers alleged that the USDA exceeded its authority when it promulgated the
marketing orders. See id. at 7-8. However, since the Supreme Court only considered the generic
advertising provisions, see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1996),
discussion of this allegation is beyond the scope of this Note.
67. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 50 Agric. Dec. 1165, 1171 (1991).
68. Since the Administrative Law Judge held for Wileman on the nonconstitutional claims,
she disposed of the case without ever reaching the constitutional issues. See id. at 1217.
69. See id. (noting that the discussion of this topic occupied 54 pages in the initial deci-
sion).
70. See id. at 1171.
71. See Wileman, 52 Agric. Dec. at 41 n.36.
72. See Gerawan Co., 50 Agric. Dec. 1363, 1364-65 (1991); Asakawa Farms, 50 Agric.
Dec. 1144, 1147 (1991) (dismissing petitions of Asakawa Farms, Chiamori Farms, Phillips
Farms, Kobashi Farms, Inc., Tange Bros., Inc., Nagao Farms, Nilmeier Farms, Chosen Enter-
prise, George Huebert Farms, Wilmer Huebert Farms, Kobashi Farms, Nakayama Farms, Inc.,
Mihara Farms).
73. See Wileman, 52 Agric. Dec. at 5. In addition to Gerawan Farms, Inc., the suit was
joined by Asakawa Farms, Inc., Chiamori Farms, Inc., Chosen Enterprises, George Huebert
Farms, Kobashi Farms, Kobashi Farms, Inc., Mihara Farms, Nagao Farms, Nakayama Farms,
Inc., Nilmeier Farms, Phillips, Inc., Tange Bros., Inc., and Wilmer Huebert Farms. See id; see
also Wileman Bros. & Elliot v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1374 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting consolidation of
the parties’ claims).
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In January 1993, a federal district court affirmed the judicial of-
ficer’s decision on all counts.74 Later that year, a three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.75 It held that the generic
advertising provisions for peaches, plums, and nectarines promul-
gated pursuant to the AMAA violated the First Amendment.76 The
government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied.77 After the denial, the Solicitor General was petitioned to
support the position of the USDA.78 In mid-January 1996, the Solici-
tor General agreed to recommend the case to the Supreme Court.79
The Court granted certiorari on June 3, 1996.80
B. Campagne v. Gerawan: The Legal Malpractice Action
After Wileman was granted certiorari, a significant disagreement
developed between Campagne and one of the sixteen respondents,
Gerawan. Gerawan retained Michael W. McConnell,81 an attorney
who had significant experience with First Amendment issues and who
had previously argued before the Supreme Court.82 Through meetings
and correspondence, Gerawan urged Campagne to refer to McCon-
nell as a resource.83 Subsequently, Gerawan shifted his position.
74. See Wileman, 52 Agric. Dec. at 5.
75. See Wileman, 58 F.3d at 1380.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1386; see also George Hostetter, Court Backs Growers on Marketing Pro-
gram; Appeal Upholds Decision on Generic Advertising, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 23, 1995, at A1
(noting that the court rejected the Department of Agriculture’s request for a rehearing).
78. See Barbara DeLollis, Ag Groups Head to High Court; Marketing Boards Ask the So-
licitor General to Make Their Case Before the Supreme Court, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 27, 1995, at
C1.
79. See Marni Katz, CTFA Case Bound for Supreme Court, TREE FRUIT, Mar. 1996, at 19,
19.
80. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 517 U.S. 1232 (1996).
81. Professor McConnell is the Presidential Professor at the University of Utah College of
Law, and his area of expertise is constitutional law. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of
1998: Hearings on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 23,
1998) (statement of Michael W. McConnell, Professor, University of Utah College of Law),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
82. See Gerawan Letter I, supra note 10, at 2.
83. One example was a letter sent to Campagne in August 1996. See id. The executive for
Gerawan who wrote the letter stated that he “was advised by all three [consulting attorneys]
that generally an attorney will advise his clients of the option of using a Supreme Court practi-
tioner when a case reaches the Supreme Court.” Id. The three consulting attorneys to whom
Gerawan referred are McConnell, P. Cameron DeVore (of Davis Wright Tremaine), and
Daniel E. Troy (of Wiley, Rein & Fielding). See Letter from P. Cameron DeVore, Attorney,
Davis Wright Tremaine, to Dan Gerawan, Gerawan Farming, Inc. 2-3 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file
ENNS EXECUTIVE EDIT2.DOC 12/09/98  7:46 AM
1998] MALPRACTICE DURING ORAL ARGUMENT? 123
While Gerawan still hoped that McConnell and Campagne could
collaborate on the merits brief,84 Gerawan began pressuring Cam-
pagne to defer to McConnell entirely for delivery of the oral argu-
ment.85 Campagne refused.86 Reportedly, when the deadline to submit
the counsel-of-record forms to the Court arrived, Campagne and
McConnell each indicated to the Court that they would present the
oral argument for the respondents.87 When the Clerk of the Court
called the respondents to clarify the situation, a bitter argument en-
sued between Campagne and McConnell.88 Since the respondents
were unable to agree, the Clerk decided to determine who would de-
liver the argument by flipping a coin.89 Campagne emerged victorious
and presented the oral argument.90
The day after Campagne’s oral argument, McConnell wrote to
the Clerk of the Court asking that a letter disavowing any concessions
made by Campagne be circulated to the Justices.91 Relations between
Campagne and Gerawan continued to deteriorate after the oral ar-
gument. Gerawan refused to pay Campagne for certain legal services
and Campagne filed a lawsuit against Gerawan in California state
court to recover his fees.92 Gerawan then counterclaimed against
Campagne for legal malpractice and various other torts.93 One of the
eight causes of action Gerawan listed was a tort entitled “failure to
with Duke Law Journal); Letter from Daniel E. Troy, Attorney, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, to
Dan Gerawan, Gerawan Farming, Inc. 1 (Oct. 22, 1996) (on file with Duke Law Journal). The
executive added: “In fact, each advised me that . . . clients were usually better served by hiring
a Supreme Court practitioner.” Gerawan Letter I, supra note 10, at 2.
84. See Gerawan Letter I, supra note 10, at 6-7, 11.
85. See id. at 10-11 (listing reasons why McConnell was better qualified to present the ar-
gument).
86. See Campagne Letter, supra note 12, at 2. See also Letter from Dan Gerawan, Ger-
awan Farming, Inc., to Thomas E. Campagne, Law Firm of Thomas E. Campagne & Assocs. 1
(Nov. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Gerawan Letter II] (on file with Duke Law Journal) (admitting the
understanding that Elliott and Kash were leaving the decision of whether Campagne should
consult McConnell up to Campagne).
87. See Tony Mauro, Clash of Cocounsel Mars Speech Case, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997,
at 13.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Letter from Michael W. McConnell, Mayer, Brown and Platt, Counsel for Re-
spondent Gerawan Farming, Inc., to William K. Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United
States 1 (Dec. 4, 1996) [hereinafter McConnell Letter] (on file with Duke Law Journal).
92. See Thompson, supra note 16, at 23.
93. See Cross-Complaint at 37, Campagne & Assocs. v. Gerawan Farming, Inc., No.
587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 22, 1997).
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refer to specialist.”94 As support for this tort action, Gerawan alleged
that Campagne had a duty to defer to an attorney with more experi-
ence on First Amendment issues and more experience before the Su-
preme Court.95
Shortly after Gerawan filed his counterclaim, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Wileman. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled
against Gerawan and the other respondents.96 Campagne and Ger-
awan petitioned the Court for rehearing separately.97 The Court de-
nied both petitions.98
While the denial of rehearing in Wileman terminated the under-
lying case, the controversy over whether Campagne committed legal
malpractice during his oral argument is far from settled. In response
to Campagne’s procedural challenges to Gerawan’s suit,99 the trial
court judge reviewed the case and held that failure to defer to a spe-
cialist does not constitute an independent cause of action.100 However,
since Campagne had no previous Supreme Court experience, the
judge held that Campagne may have had a duty to associate with or
professionally consult another lawyer,101 and that the failure to meet
this duty could support a legal malpractice cause of action for negli-
gence.102
94. Id. at 34.
95. See id. at 34.
96. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2141-42 (1997).
97. See Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing (Campagne), Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, 118 S. Ct. 25 (1997) (No. 95-1184) (petitioning on behalf of Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., Kash, Inc., Gerawan Farming, Inc., Asakawa Farms, Inc., Chiamori Farms, Inc., Phillips
Farms, Inc., Kobashi Farms, inc., Tange Bros., Inc., Nagao Farms, Nilmeier Farms, Chosen En-
terprises, George Huebert Farms, Wilmer Huebert Farms, Kobashi Farms, Nakayama Farms,
Inc., and Mihara Farms); Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing (Moody), Wileman (No. 95-
1184) (petitioning on behalf of Gerawan Farming, Inc., Kash, Inc.. Nakayama Farms, Inc., Ko-
bashi Farms, Kobashi Farms, Inc., Mihara Farms, Nilmeier Farms, Chosen Enterprises, George
Huebert Farms, Tange Bros., Inc., Chiamori Farms, Inc. and Nagao Farms) Gerawan’s new
Counsel of Record was James A. Moody and Brian C. Leighton assisted in preparing the peti-
tion. See id. at 11.
98. See Wileman, 118 S. Ct. at 25.
99. See Decision Denying Motion to Strike at 14-15, Campagne, No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super.
Ct. decided Nov. 19, 1997) (ruling on Campagne’s general and special demurrers to all eight
causes of action for uncertainty and a motion to strike portions of the cross-complaint).
100. See id. at 14. Gerawan based his allegation on Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404
(Ct. App. 1979), which held that failure to refer to a specialist in tax matters was negligence.
See id. at 415-16. The trial court judge held that Horne was inapplicable to Campagne because
it involved a “commonly recognized” legal specialty, tax, and Campagne did not. See Decision
Denying Motion to Strike at 14, Campagne, No. 587667-7.
101. See Decision Denying Motion to Strike at 14-15, Campagne, No. 587667-7.
102. See id.
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III. GERAWAN CANNOT PREVAIL IN ITS LEGAL MALPRACTICE SUIT.
To evaluate the merits of Gerawan’s claim, it must be placed in
the context of malpractice law. In California, a legal malpractice ac-
tion for negligence is comprised of the same elements as other kinds
of actionable negligence.103 Thus, for Gerawan to succeed in its legal
malpractice suit against Campagne, it must prove that Campagne
owed it a duty, that Campagne breached that duty, and that the
breach caused it to suffer damages. Even if Gerawan can prove that a
duty existed, Campagne breached the duty, and that Gerawan suf-
fered damages, it is unlikely that Gerawan will be able to prove cau-
sation. Consequently, Gerawan cannot prevail in its malpractice ac-
tion.
A. Campagne’s Duty to Gerawan Farming
If Gerawan is to be successful in proving legal malpractice, it
must first establish that Campagne owed it a duty.104 There are at
least two types of relationships that could give rise to a duty. The
typical relationship that gives rise to a duty in a legal malpractice ac-
tion is an attorney-client relationship.105 In Campagne, it is unclear
whether such a relationship existed between Campagne and Gerawan
at the time of oral argument. In its complaint, Gerawan maintains
that it was a client of Campagne’s throughout the duration of Wile-
man, and that Campagne therefore owed it a duty. 106 Campagne, on
the other hand, avers that the attorney-client relationship terminated
during the summer of 1996 when Gerawan retained McConnell.107
Campagne reasons that Gerawan’s “retention of successor counsel
103. See Nichols v. Keller, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1682 (Ct. App. 1993). The four elements
are: (1) duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. See id.; see also Lucas v.
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Cal. 1961) (discussing legal malpractice in terms of these four
elements, but not explicitly setting them forth). According to Mallen & Smith, “[t]he most
common form of a legal malpractice action is for negligence.” 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note
15, § 8.1, at 401.
104. See Nichols, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1682. The existence of a duty owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff is a question of law for the court. See Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d
520, 525 (Ct. App. 1966).
105. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 8.2, at 556.
106. See Cross-Complaint at 6-7, Campagne, No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 22,
1997); see also Gerawan Letter I, supra note 10, at 6-7 (stating that Gerawan had not “left the
group [of sixteen respondents]” and that it was “still a client” and “ha[s] been a client”).
107. See Gerawan Letter I, supra note 10, at 6 (recalling that Campagne informed Gerawan
that, as of August 14, 1996, Campagne considered the relationship terminated).
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before the Supreme Court . . . vitiated any continuing duty of care
[he] owed to Gerawan Farming.”108
Campagne’s contention that Gerawan’s retention of McConnell
abrogated the attorney-client relationship is supported by case law.
Several courts have held that employing a second attorney severs the
attorney-client relationship between the client and the first attor-
ney.109 An example is Belli v. Shaw.110 In Belli, the Washington Su-
preme Court held that “[e]mployment of other counsel, which is in-
consistent with the continuance of the former relationship, shows an
unmistakable purpose to sever the former relationship.”111
Campagne was staunchly opposed to retaining McConnell to as-
sist in the preparation of the briefs and oral argument of Wileman.112
Prior to the oral argument, Campagne informed all the respondents
who wanted McConnell to brief and argue Wileman that retaining
McConnell was inconsistent with his [Campagne’s] continuing to
serve as their attorney. 113 Consequently, Campagne informed them
that retention of McConnell terminated the attorney-client relation-
ship with the respondents who stated a preference for McConnell.114
Thus, the court could hold that the attorney-client relationship be-
tween Campagne and Gerawan was terminated by the time the al-
leged malpractice occurred and, therefore, that Campagne owed no
duty to Gerawan.
However, a second relationship that might give rise to a duty is
an attorney-former client relationship. The prior existence of an at-
torney-client relationship forbids any act by the attorney that will in-
jure the former client in matters involving that representation.115 The
rationale behind this principle is “to remove any possibility of poten-
tial compromise . . . due to divided or conflicting loyalties.”116
Even had the attorney-client relationship been abrogated, Ger-
awan’s interests were still identical to those of the other respondents
108. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 2, Campagne, No.
587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jul. 23, 1997).
109. See, e.g., Barry v. Ashley Anderson, P.C., 718 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (D. Colo. 1989);
Belli v. Shaw, 657 P.2d 315, 319 (Wash. 1983).
110. 657 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1983).
111. Id. at 319.
112. See Campagne Letter, supra note 12, at 1-3.
113. See id. at 1-2.
114. See id. at 2.
115. See Yorn v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 669, 675 (Ct. App. 1979).
116. Id.
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in Wileman. Consequently, any action Gerawan took with respect to
Wileman would necessarily affect the matter in which he formerly
represented Gerawan. Consequently, a trial court could, and likely
would, find that Campagne had a duty not to take action that would
injure his former client. Specifically, the trial court would find that
Campagne owed Gerawan a duty because of the attorney-former cli-
ent relationship.
Thus, whether the connection between Campagne and Gerawan
was an attorney-client relationship or an attorney-former client rela-
tionship, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Campagne
owed a duty to Gerawan.
B. Breach
The existence of a duty would impose on Campagne the obliga-
tion to represent Gerawan with the same care as “lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance
of the tasks which they undertake.”117 The standard of care is that of
members of the profession in “the same or similar locality under
similar circumstances”118 and encompasses the obligation to make an
“informed decision as to a course of conduct.”119 General principles of
fiduciary relationships and the California Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility also govern the standard.120 If Gerawan can
prove that the actions of Campagne did not meet this standard of
care, it will have proven that Campagne breached the duty owed to
Gerawan.121
To make the standard of care more concrete, the trial court will
need to specify the appropriate comparison population under the
“same or similar locality” requirement.122 In the context of medical
117. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961); accord Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 423 (Cal. 1971) (citing the language used in Lucas); Croo-
kall v. Davis, Punelli, Keathley & Willard, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1048, 1067 (Ct. App. 1998) (same).
118. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 592 n.3, 596 (Cal. 1975) (approving jury instructions con-
taining the “same or similar locality under similar circumstances” language); accord Unigard
Ins. Group v. O’Flaherty & Belgum, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing the
language used in Lewis); Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal. App. 3d 970, 976 (Ct. App. 1978) (same);
Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809 (Ct. App. 1975) (same).
119. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 595.
120. See Mirabito v. Liccardo, 4 Cal. App. 4th 41, 45 (Ct. App. 1992) (“[The] rules, together
with statutes and general principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define the
duty component of the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his client.”).
121. See id.
122. See Lewis, 530 P.2d at 592 n.3, 596.
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malpractice, California courts have construed “locality” to mean
“community.”123 Since Campagne practices in Fresno, California,124
and Fresno is the largest metropolitan area in a 200 miles radius, the
locality will probably be Fresno and the immediate area around the
city.
In determining the standard of care, the trial court must also ex-
amine the specific situation in which Campagne found himself. 125
Prior to Wileman, he had no prior Supreme Court experience or
training in a Supreme Court practice.126 When reviewing Campagne’s
procedural challenges to Campagne, the trial court judge determined
that Campagne’s lack of experience triggered the application of Rule
3-110(C) of the California Model Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity, which states:
If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the le-
gal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform
such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropri-
ate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to
be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before
performance is required.127
Since Rule 3-110(C) governs, Campagne had an obligation to ei-
ther associate with or professionally consult another attorney or ac-
quire sufficient learning and skill prior to the oral argument. Further,
legal malpractice doctrine mandates that Campagne make informed
judgments with respect to the course of conduct taken. 128 Combining
the analysis of the prior two paragraphs, in summary, the trial court
123. See Sinz v. Owens, 205 P.2d 3, 5-6 (Cal. 1949). In Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman,
234 Cal. App. 3d 1432 (Ct. App. 1991), the California Court of Appeals found “the law’s treat-
ment of medical malpractice is sufficiently analogous to legal malpractice for the standards re-
garding the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases to serve as a guide.” See id. at
1438.
124. See Martindale-Hubbell, Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Locator (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://lawyers.martindale.com/marhub/firm?_firm-no=749828001>.
125. See Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526 (Ct. App. 1966).
126. See Lisa Agrimonti, Lawyer Gets His Day in Court, SANTA CLARA MAG., Summer
1997, at 28 (stating that Wileman was Campagne’s first Supreme Court argument). Campagne,
however, was an experienced litigator, becoming a member of the California bar in 1975, see
Martindale-Hubbell, Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Locator (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://lawyers.martindale.com/marhub/firm?_firm-no=749828001>, and forming his own law
firm in 1978, see Agrimonti, supra, at 28. The unique features of practice before the Supreme
Court are explored at supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
127. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-
110(C) (1997).
128. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 596 (Cal. 1975).
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will consider whether a reasonable attorney from Fresno, California,
in the position of Campagne, with no prior Supreme Court experi-
ence, would have made the decision to brief the Court and conduct
oral argument himself.
In some circumstances, a trial court could recognize as reason-
able the decision of a generalist to opt to acquire the skill and knowl-
edge necessary to meet the standard of care envisioned by Rule 3-
110(C). There is an obvious niche for Supreme Court specialists in
the United States legal market,129 and California clients do not have
many attorneys to chose from if they wish to have a California attor-
ney brief and argue their case.130 Moreover, attorneys rarely receive
the opportunity to brief and argue before the Court131 and thus gener-
alists who do not opt to take the opportunity to brief and argue the
case when certiorari is granted are unlikely to receive other chances.
Recognizing the reasonableness of such a decision, therefore, will
have a direct affect of increasing the number of attorneys with sig-
nificant Supreme Court experience. This will expand the number of
choices in the legal marketplace.
In Campagne’s case, however, a court will probably determine
that opting to acquire skill and knowledge was not reasonable. As
soon as Wileman was granted certiorari, Gerawan secured McCon-
nell’s assistance for preparation of the brief and oral argument.132 Al-
though cost often factors predominantly in the decision of whether to
retain a specialist,133 Gerawan removed cost from the evaluation by
129. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
130. Between 1977-82, only approximately six percent of the Supreme Court bar hailed
from California. See MCGUIRE, supra note 36, at 131.
131. The Court only heard approximately 80 cases during the 1997-98 Term. See David Se-
gal, For DNC Lawyers, Patience Is a Necessary Virtue; Work? Plenty of It. High Profile? Sure.
But About the Check for Legal Fees . . . It Might Be Late., WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1998, at F9. It
is true, however, that many law firms and advocacy groups file amicus briefs to boost their
reputation as “Supreme Court savvy.” Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas, 82 A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1996, at 46, 48.
132. See Dennis Pollock, Grower-Packers Split on Choice of Lawyers; A Case to Be Argued
Before the U.S. Supreme Court on Behalf of Valley Growers in December Has Two Candidates
for Counsel, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 26, 1996, at C1 (stating that McConnell was hired in early
August).
133. Associating with or consulting a specialist could create astronomical costs. Specialists
earn $300-$500 per hour for their labors. See Segal, supra note 45, at F12. Even if firms do not
bill hourly, the prices attached to Supreme Court advocacy still are incredibly high. For exam-
ple, Sidley & Austin’s Washington, D.C. office quoted the following figures for its Supreme
Court practice: petitions for certiorari generally run $25,000-$40,000; amicus briefs at the cer-
tiorari stage run about $10,000; briefs in opposition to certiorari, $5,000-$10,000; reply briefs,
$5,000; and oral arguments, $10,000-$20,000. See Coyle, supra note 53, at A1. Anecdotal evi-
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informing Campagne and the other respondents that he would pay all
the bills for McConnell’s services.134 Moreover, opposing counsel in
Wileman was the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General is respon-
sible for all cases before the Supreme Court in which the United
States is a party,135 and consequently most attorneys in that office
have vast amounts of experience and significant resources upon
which to draw. Campagne, on the other hand, is the name partner in
a small, eight-attorney law firm.136 Comparatively, it would seem that
he did not have nearly as many resources or as much experience as
his opponent.
The trial court should conclude that a reasonable generalist from
Fresno with no prior Supreme Court experience would have associ-
ated with or professionally consulted a Supreme Court specialist, es-
pecially if a specialist was readily available, cost was removed from
the equation, and the Solicitor General was the opponent at oral ar-
gument. If the trial court so concludes, Gerawan will have proven
breach.
C. Damages137
To prevail in its legal malpractice claim, Gerawan also must
prove damages. “[D]amages may not be based upon sheer specula-
tion or surmise, and the mere possibility or even probability that
damage will result from wrongful conduct does not render it action-
able.”138 The adverse decision in Wileman definitely had a financial
impact on Gerawan. Had the Supreme Court decided Wileman in fa-
vor of the respondents, the $6.5 million in marketing order assess-
ments139 placed in trust would have been returned to the respondents.
Since Gerawan paid some of the money in the trust,140 when the ad-
dence suggests the estimate for oral argument is low. The sole practitioner from Wichita, Kan-
sas, who argued O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), stated that most Washington,
D.C. firms that quoted a price for giving the oral argument cited a fee of $48,000-$50,000. See
Coyle, supra note 53, at A1.
134. See Gerawan Letter II, supra note 86, at 2.
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1994).
136. See Martindale-Hubbell, Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Locator (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://lawyers.martindale.com/marhub/firm?_firm-no=749828001>.
137. For ease of discussion, damages is discussed out of sequence.
138. In re Easterbrook, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1541, 1544 (Ct. App. 1988).
139. See Skrzycki, supra note 64, at D1.
140. See First Amended Cross-Complaint at 12, Campagne & Assocs. v. Gerawan Farming,
Inc., No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998) (calculating that between 1989 and 1996,
Gerawan Farming contributed $3,633,287 pursuant to the marketing order).
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verse decision was entered, it lost its money. Therefore, if Gerawan
satisfies the other three elements of legal malpractice, it will also
meet the standard for damages: that it suffered “appreciable and ac-
tual harm.”141
D. Causation
The presence of a duty, a breach, and damages is not sufficient
for Gerawan to succeed in its legal malpractice action. Causation also
must be proven.142 That is, Gerawan must show a direct nexus be-
tween the breach and the damages.143 A direct nexus is shown if “but
for” the attorney’s breach of duty, the litigant would have received a
favorable judgment from the court.144 Essentially, this requires the
litigant to relitigate the underlying case in order to prove causation.
The relitigation of the underlying case is constrained by legal
malpractice doctrine, which both requires the identification of a par-
ticular issue (or issues) that should have been argued differently145
and protects an attorney if reasonable interpretations of complex
law146 or reasonable tactical decisions are made.147 If an issue outside
of the protected realm can be identified, it then must be shown that
the attorney’s position on the issue at oral argument caused the ad-
verse decision.148 The elusive nature of the cause-in-fact requirement,
in conjunction with the difficulty in identifying an issue that is not
barred by protections given attorneys by legal malpractice doctrine
makes causation difficult, if not impossible, to prove.149
1. Gerawan Has Failed to Identify an Issue that Falls Outside the
Area Protected by Legal Malpractice Doctrine. Gerawan began its
efforts to prove causation by identifying four issues in Campagne’s
141. Thompson v. Halvonik, 36 Cal. App. 4th 657, 661 (Ct. App. 1995).
142. See United Community Church v. Garcin, 231 Cal. App. 3d 327, 334 (Ct. App. 1991);
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 153 (Ct. App. 1968).
143. See Sukoff v. Lemkin, 202 Cal. App. 3d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 1988).
144. See id.
145. See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 15, § 29.41, at 772 (“In presenting the underlying
appeal in the subsequent legal malpractice action, the parties must specify the issues that
should have been urged in the underlying action.”). Failure to specify the issues is a failure to
prove causation. See id.
146. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
147. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975).
148. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 153 (Ct. App. 1968). The attorney’s ac-
tion need not be the sole cause of the client’s loss, just a substantial factor. See id. at 153 n.7.
149. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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argument that a specialist would have argued differently. These
issues are: (1) whether the government has the authority under the
First Amendment to decide who will speak for the growers or what
messages will be communicated; (2) whether the generic advertising
program would be constitutional if the advertising were confined to
the homogenous products or common attributes of the products; (3)
whether the constitutional violation could be cured by more specific
findings by Congress or the Secretary of Agriculture; and (4) whether
the objections were primarily limited to maladministration of the
program.150
a. Reasonable Interpretations of Complex Points of Law are Protected.
An analysis of the first three issues identified by Gerawan reveals
that the differences between the arguments actually made by Cam-
pagne and the arguments Gerawan alleges a specialist would have
made stem from differing interpretations of First Amendment law.
Attorneys are protected from malpractice liability if their interpreta-
tion of a complex legal issue “was clearly an arguable one upon which
reasonable lawyers could differ.”151 Thus, the trial court must first de-
termine whether First Amendment law is sufficiently complex
enough to trigger the protection and then evaluate whether the Cam-
pagne’s position was reasonable.
The issues in Wileman implicated two lines of First Amendment
doctrine. First, since the statutory provisions at issue dealt with com-
mercial speech (advertising), the respondents argued that the generic
advertising provisions could not pass the test set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,152 the
seminal case for commercial speech.153 Second, since the statutory
150. The day after the oral argument, McConnell sent a letter to the clerk of the Court. See
McConnell Letter, supra note 91, at 1. In this letter, he identified four issues from Campagne’s
oral argument with which Gerawan did not agree. See id. Since McConnell is a specialist and he
has already identified issues he would have argued differently, Gerawan likely will rely on all
issues listed in the letter.
151. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 594.
152. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Central Hudson test has a four-part analysis: the speech must
be protected by the First Amendment; the speech must concern a lawful activity and not be
misleading; there must be a substantial government interest in restricting the speech; and the
regulation must directly advance the government interest asserted and must not be more exten-
sive than necessary to serve that interest. See id. at 566.
153. Brief for Respondents (McConnell) at 13-32, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (arguing that the
compelled advertising programs cannot be sustained under Central Hudson); Brief for Respon-
dents (Campagne) at *9-29, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (same).
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provisions mandated financial contributions from the respondents,
they argued that the challenged provisions could not survive the tests
set forth for coerced speech.154 Both lines of doctrine require intricate
analysis. Moreover, two Circuits split over these issues.155 Conse-
quently, a court probably will find the First Amendment doctrines at
issue sufficiently complex to trigger the protection.
An analysis of each of the three issues illustrates that a court also
probably will conclude that Campagne’s positions with respect to the
issues were reasonable. The first issue Gerawan identified was
whether, under the First Amendment, the government has the
authority to decide who will speak for the growers and what messages
will be communicated.156 Campagne argued that the government
sometimes, depending on the commodity, 157 has the authority under
the First Amendment to decide who will speak for the growers and
what messages will be communicated.158 Specifically, he presented a
narrowly focused argument: only the generic advertising provisions of
the peach, nectarine, and plum marketing orders violated the First
Amendment.159 Gerawan, on the other hand, alleges that a specialist
would have taken a broader approach and argued the that any ge-
neric advertisements violate the First Amendment.160
When building his case, Campagne undoubtedly would have
considered precedent in the area of generic advertising. All previous
lawsuits attacking the AMAA were targeted at the generic advertis-
ing provisions regarding individual commodities.161 For example, in
154. See Brief for Respondents (McConnell) at 33-41, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (arguing that
since the assessments are mandatory and the money pays for promulgating a message
(advertisement), the marketing order is coercing speech in violation of the First Amendment);
Brief for Respondents (Campagne) at *42-49, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (same).
155. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1997) (stating that the
petition for certiorari was granted to resolve the Circuit split).
156. See McConnell Letter, supra note 91, at 1.
157. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S.
Ct. 2130 (1997) (No. 95-1184) (stating that the respondents were not arguing that the generic
beef and milk advertising programs were invalid).
158. See id. (responding “no” when asked whether all generic advertising programs are un-
constitutional).
159. See id.; id. at 56 (stating that the respondents were not trying to “vitiate” the entire
marketing order).
160. See Brief for Respondents (McConnell) at 10, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (arguing that all
government-sponsored collective advertising programs fail to satisfy the constitutional test used
to evaluate interference with commercial speech).
161. See Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenging the
generic advertising provisions of the AMAA for almonds); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d
1119, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1989) (challenging the generic advertising provisions of the AMAA for
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United States. v. Frame,162 a Third Circuit challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the assessments for generic advertising imposed on the
beef industry,163 the court’s First Amendment analysis focused exclu-
sively on beef.164 In Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States,165 almond pro-
ducers challenged the generic advertising provisions of the marketing
order solely in the context of almonds,166 and subsequently the Ninth
Circuit’s First Amendment analysis focused solely on almonds.167
Similarly, up until Wileman reached the Supreme Court, the focus
was commondity-specfic and thus in reversing the district court’s dis-
position of Wileman, the Ninth Circuit adopted a commodity-specific
approach, focusing on peaches and nectarines.168 Although Gerawan
can make a case that a specialist would have made a broader argu-
ment, a court is likely to find that Campagne’s approach was reason-
able in light of the narrow approach taken by past litigants and
courts.
The second issue, whether the program is constitutional if con-
fined to homogenous products,169 is another permutation of the dis-
pute between Campagne and Gerawan over how to construct the
First Amendment argument. During oral argument, Campagne con-
ceded that the program in question would be constitutional if applied
to homogenous products.170 Again, Campagne made a narrow argu-
beef).  Between 1991 and 1996, generic advertising by boards was challenged for at least nine
individual commodities, including the boards for kiwis and apples.  See Kenneth Howe & Julia
Angwin, Court Ruling Threatens Agricultural Ad Programs: Required Payments from Growers
Could End, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1996, at A1.
162. 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989).
163. See id. at 1124-25.
164. See id. at 1129-37.
165. 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. See id. at 433.
167. See id. at 433-40.
168. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth
Circuit did not consider the plum advertisement because the plum marketing order was termi-
nated in 1991. See id. at 1373 n.1.
169. See McConnell Letter, supra note 91, at 1.
170. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 117 S. Ct.
2130 (1997) (No. 95-1184). When attorneys refer to homogenous products, they are referring to
commodities covered by the AMAA that they perceive as interchangeable such as milk. See id.
at 35 (stating that “[w]hen you buy milk, you don’t know if it’s a Jersey or a Guernsey milk
you’re drinking” and that since all milk is “white and wet . . . [there is not] much opportunity to
prefer one [producer] over another”). Indeed, all dairy farmers bring their milk to a common
processing plant where the milk is commingled, packaged, and sold. See The National Dairy
Council, Milking (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.milk.co.uk/milking.html>. Consequently,
when advertising milk, the emphasis is on the product, not the particular brand. Like most tree
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ment that sometimes generic advertising provisions for agricultural
commodities are constitutional.171 Gerawan contends that a specialist
would not have made such a concession. Rather, Gerawan posits that
a specialist would have made a broad argument that the challenged
program is unconstitutional whether applied to homogenous or non-
homogenous products.172
The difference of opinion between the two parties again hinges
on Campagne’s selection of a commodity-specific approach. Cam-
pagne attempted to distinguish the category to which peaches, plums
and nectarines belong, the non-homogenous group, from the universe
of homogenous products, such as milk; Gerawan argues that any ge-
neric marketing provision instituted by the government is invalid. A
court, therefore, again is likely to find that Campagne’s position was
reasonable and thus protected.
The third issue identified by Gerawan, whether or not specific
findings by the Department of Agriculture would impact the out-
come of Wileman,173 is also a reasonable disagreement over a complex
area of First Amendment law. During the oral argument, Campagne
conceded that if the record contained findings by the Secretary of
Agriculture that the generic advertising program directly advanced
the government’s interest, then he would not contest the generic ad-
fruit, however, peaches, nectarines, and plums are distributed under a brand name. See Brief
for Respondents (McConnell) at 5, Wileman (No. 95-1184). There are numerous varieties of
each commodity, see id. at 5 n.5 (stating that California produces at least 69 varieties of
peaches, 61 varieties of plums, and 80 varieties of nectarines), and there are significant differ-
ences in taste and quality among different varieties, see id. at 6. Moreover, agriculturists believe
that different farming practices can result in distinct, higher quality production within the varie-
ties. See id. at 18-19. In sum, agriculturists believe that peaches, nectarines and plums are non-
homogeneous commodities. The importance of whether a product is homogenous relates to
economic theory. If products truly are fungible, producers would not benefit significantly from
open competition because advertising would merely encourage a shift in the demand from one
similar product to the next. See Jim Rossi & Mollie Weighner, An Empirical Examination of
the Iowa Bar’s Approach to Regulating Lawyer Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 179, 227 (1991)
(discussing, in the context of lawyer advertising, the economic theory that advertising of rela-
tively homogenous products leads to price competition among sellers). Each seller would have
an incentive to reduce prices in an attempt to regain his or her share of the market. See id. Ge-
neric advertising for homogenous products enhances overall demand through consumer infor-
mation. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia, Wileman (No. 95-1184), available in
1996 WL 426255, at *20-22. With an overall increase in demand, producers will be able to raise
prices. See id. Therefore, advertising can act as a price support. See id.
171. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Wileman (No. 95-1184).
172. See McConnell Letter, supra note 91, at 1.
173. See id.
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vertising provisions.174 Gerawan, on the other hand, argues that such
findings are irrelevant to the case because the entire marketing order
cannot survive a constitutional challenge.175
Since Campagne’s approach is based directly on the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Wileman,176 the trial court is likely to conclude that
Campagne’s position was reasonable and therefore protected. As
mentioned previously, advertisements fall under the rubric of com-
mercial speech doctrine.177 Since the provision of the AMAA at issue
in Wileman was generic advertisements, the courts reviewed whether
the advertisements passed the Central Hudson test. 178 The Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the advertisements at issue were permitted un-
der the First Amendment,179 were not misleading,180 and served a sub-
stantial government interest.181 Therefore, it continued its analysis
with a review of whether the regulation directly advanced the gov-
ernment’s interest. Since the government could not prove the superi-
ority of the generic advertising program to individual advertising, the
court held that the generic advertising program did not directly ad-
vance the substantial interest the government had, and therefore
failed the Central Hudson test.182 By taking the position he did, Cam-
pagne, in effect, was stating that had the government showed the ad-
vertisements directly advanced the government interest, the adver-
tisements could have survived under Central Hudson. Since
Campagne’s approach to this issue is well-grounded in prior case law,
174. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (emphasizing that if
the government is going to require assessments for generic advertising, the government must
“show a problem that requires a governmental compelling interest”).
175. See Brief for Respondents (McConnell) at 16, Wileman (No. 95-1184) (arguing that
agricultural marketing programs are “naked preferences” for politically favored industries).
176. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1995).
177. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
178. See supra note 152 (setting out the four-part Central Hudson test).
179. See Wileman, 58 F.3d at 1377-78.
180. See id. at 1378 (implying that the speech was non-misleading by stating that it would
apply Central Hudson, the test for restrictions on “lawful, non-misleading commercial speech”).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1379. The Ninth Circuit conducted the following analysis: “whether the man-
datory generic advertising program sells the product more effectively than the ‘specific, tar-
geted marketing efforts of individual handlers.’” Id. at 1378 (quoting Cal-Almond, Inc. v.
USDA, 14 F.3d 429, 439 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that generic advertising by the USDA did not
“directly advance” the government’s interests in promoting almond sales under the Central
Hudson test because the USDA presented no evidence to indicate that its generic advertising
was more effective than the advertising that the individual handlers would have done without
the federal program)).
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the trial court is likely to conclude that his concession was reasonable
and thus protected. Consequently, Gerawan will not be able to build
its case on any of the first three issues.
b. Reasonable Tactical Decisions Made by Attorneys Also Are Pro-
tected. The fourth issue, whether the objections were primarily lim-
ited to maladministration of the program, is also likely to be found
protected because California malpractice law protects reasonable tac-
tical decisions made by attorneys.183
With respect to the issue in question, Campagne could argue that
he consciously constructed his argument to focus on the maladminis-
tration aspect of the program as a tactical decision. When Wileman
was before the Ninth Circuit, that court held that any government
program that burdens speech may not be sustained under Central
Hudson if it “provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose.”184 Campagne’s attempt to demonstrate that
the advertising programs provided only ineffective or remote support
for the government’s interest in maintaining the stability of peach,
nectarine and plum markets could be found to be a reasonable tacti-
cal decision by the trial court. Thus, the fourth issue, like the other
three, is likely to be protected.
2. Even Assuming Campagne’s Position on One of the Four Is-
sues Is Not Protected, Gerawan Will Fail to Prove Causation. Should
the trial court conclude that one of these issues does not fall under
the protections granted by legal malpractice doctrine, it would still
remain for Gerawan to prove that Campagne’s oral argument was the
cause-in-fact of the adverse decision by the Supreme Court. To prove
that the oral argument was the cause-in-fact, Gerawan must show
that Wileman should have been decided differently.185 In sum, Ger-
awan must persuade the trial court that given a different oral argu-
ment, a “reasonable” Supreme Court Justice would have held the ge-
183. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975); see also Kirsch v. Duryea, 578 P.2d
935, 939 (Cal. 1978) (recognizing that attorneys engaged in litigation should be granted latitude
in choosing between alternative tactical strategies).
184. See Wileman, 58 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
185. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 820, 840 (Ct. App.
1997) (noting that “[i]t is the universal rule that the elements of causation and damages . . . re-
quire the determination of what should have happened in the underlying case” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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neric advertising provisions of the AMAA violated the First
Amendment.
In order to show that a Justice would have changed her mind if
she had heard a different oral argument, Gerawan must show that a
reasonable Justice considers oral arguments important. Ample his-
torical evidence exists that suggests that Supreme Court Justices do
not firmly decide cases prior to oral argument and that there are
many vote switches between the time the Justices read the case briefs
and the time the opinion is issued.186 Gerawan can probably persuade
the trial court that oral argument is important to the reasonable Jus-
tice. The preponderance of statements made by judges and Justices
support the thesis that oral argument is important.187 Even Justice
Scalia, who referred to oral arguments as a “dog and pony show” be-
fore his appointment to the Court, has come to regard oral argument
as an important part of the appellate process.188 Consequently, Ger-
awan can probably establish the threshold for its effort to prove cau-
sation.
Once it is established in principle that oral argument could have
influenced the decision in a case before the Supreme Court, a causal
relation between the particular oral argument and the adverse deci-
sion must be proven.189 A causal relationship may be assumed if “as a
matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission might be
expected to produce a particular result, and if that result has in fact
followed.”190
To satisfy its burden of proof, Gerawan presumably will call wit-
nesses to testify that, given Campagne’s concession, the outcome in
186. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 178-206 (discussing how “vote switches have been a
prominent feature of the decision process throughout the Supreme Court’s history”).
187. See ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 569 (7th ed. 1993).
188. O’BRIEN, supra note 49, at 281 (claiming that Scalia’s position with respect to oral ar-
gument has softened). Despite the fact that Gerawan can probably demonstrate that oral ar-
gument is important to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the emphasis several of the
other Justices place on oral argument is unknown. Moreover, Justice Thomas reportedly bases
no part of his decisions on oral argument, and decides cases solely on the briefs. See Savage,
supra note 40, at 55-56. It appears, however, that Justice Thomas’s approach is the exception
rather than the rule. See STERN ET AL., supra note 187, at 569.
189. See Mattco Forge, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 841-42 (noting that it is not enough for a mal-
practice plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s services were negligent and, therefore, could
have caused unsuccessful disposition of the plaintiff’s claim, but rather that the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant’s negligence did in fact cause the adverse decision).
190. Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 253 (Ct. App. 1992)
(emphasis added).
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Wileman was expected. One witness option that is precluded is asking
the Justices themselves to testify. Notwithstanding other issues in-
volved with subpoenaing the Justices, California case law states that
testimony by a judge about matters that took place before her in her
judicial capacity is too prejudicial.191 Thus, Gerawan must rely on
other witnesses.
Already, two attorneys have sent memoranda to the California
trial court opining that Campagne was the direct cause of the Court’s
decision. One of these attorneys is James A. Moody, a solo practitio-
ner from Washington, D.C.192 Moody submitted a declaration to the
court averring that Campagne’s oral argument was “defective” and
was the “direct and proximate cause of the 5-4 reversal.”193 The sec-
ond is P. Cameron DeVore, an attorney at Davis Wright Tremaine in
Seattle,194 who stated: “In my judgment, the 5-to-4 loss that Mr. Cam-
pagne and the respondents in [Wileman] suffered in that case in the
U.S. Supreme Court was caused, in substantial part, by the unrespon-
sive and unsophisticated oral argument made by Mr. Campagne to
the Court in the case.”195
The defense surely will point out to the trial court that both of
these attorneys were affiliated with Gerawan prior to the oral argu-
ment and that both advocated the retention of McConnell to brief
and argue the case.196 Thus, Campagne probably will be able to con-
vince the trial court that the two witnesses were predisposed to favor
191. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 883 (Ct. App. 1973) (stating that
when a judge is an expert witness for matters that took place before her, it “appears [that she
is] throwing the weight of [her] position and authority behind one of two opposing litigants”
and that “it [is] only slightly less prejudicial when a judge expresses his opinion as a witness
about events that occurred in an earlier trial over which he had presided”).
192. Moody reportedly is “one of the leading experts on the history, law, administration,
policy, and reform of agricultural marketing orders issued under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937.” Declaration of James A. Moody at 2, Campagne & Assocs. v. Ger-
awan Farming, Inc., No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 5, 1998).
193. Id. at 21. In addition, shortly after oral argument, Moody sent Campagne a letter in
which he predicted that the Supreme Court would likely reverse the Ninth Circuit because of
Campagne’s faulty argument. See Bier, supra note 13, at B1.
194. See Declaration of P. Cameron DeVore at 1, Campagne, No. 587667-7 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed May 1, 1998). DeVore’s practice focuses on the First Amendment, and he has handled
numerous First Amendment cases before the Supreme Court. See id.
195. Id.
196. See Letter from P. Cameron DeVore, Davis Wright Tremaine, to Dan Gerawan, Ger-
awan Farming, Inc. 2-3 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that
McConnell, not Campagne, should present the oral argument); Brief for Respondents
(McConnell) at 50, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) (No. 95-1184)
(listing Moody as one of the submitting attorneys).
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Gerawan’s position, thereby weakening their testimony that Cam-
pagne’s oral argument was the cause-in-fact of the loss.
Another option for Gerawan is to call Supreme Court specialists
to testify. Given the media statements of such specialists,197 Gerawan
probably will be able to find Supreme Court specialists to testify that
Campagne caused the adverse decision in Wileman. Campagne
probably can find his own witnesses who are willing to contest the
opinions; it is not a given that Supreme Court specialists are superior
at oral argument. That is, for every witness who opines that Cam-
pagne’s concessions caused the adverse decision, Campagne should
be able to call a witness to downplay the need for specialists and to
argue that Campagne was not the cause.
In addition to presenting his own specialists as expert witnesses,
Campagne can point to several factors that might undermine the
credibility of Gerawan’s specialists. For example, Supreme Court
specialists have a great self-interest in promoting the importance of
their trade. Campagne can emphasize to the court the self-serving na-
ture of Supreme Court specialist testimony. After all, specialization
occurred, in part, to help firms compete for business and expand their
practices.198
Campagne can also point to the fact that the Court itself has
suggested that litigants be wary of specialists. At least two Justices
have warned litigants about the pitfalls of hiring specialists. Both Jus-
tice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist have expressed reserva-
tions about hiring specialists when a case reaches the Supreme
Court.199 Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that it factors
the possibility of missteps at oral argument into its decisions. In
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,200 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
197. For example, Bruce Ennis, a partner at the Washington, D.C. office of Chicago’s Jen-
ner & Block who has appeared as counsel in more than 250 Supreme Court cases, stated, “[i]t’s
horrible to watch [non-specialists], just horrible . . . . People usually bring their close friends
and family along to the court, only to see them get embarrassed or caught up in conundrums.
It’s very unpleasant.” Segal, supra note 45, at F12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ex-
pressing similar sentiments, Andrew Frey, of Mayer, once opined: “We [Supreme Court spe-
cialists] know how to hit the right notes in a way that an ordinary practitioner wouldn’t know.”
Joan Biskupic, Legal Elite Vie for Court Time in Pursuit of Supreme Challenge, WASH. POST,
Dec. 2, 1996, at A19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
199. See Biskupic, supra note 197, at A19 (recounting observations by Justice O’Connor
that hometown lawyers may do as well as or as badly as Washington-based lawyers and by
Chief Justice Rehnquist that specialists may be unfamiliar with the facts and the lower court
record of a case).
200. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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the majority stated: “We are loathe to attach conclusive weight to the
relatively spontaneous responses of counsel to equally spontaneous
questioning from the Court during oral argument.”201 In Rose v.
Mitchell,202 Justice Blackmun, writing for himself, Justice Burger and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated that although a “flat concession”
normally would be given effect, the Court would overlook the con-
cession if it were plainly incorrect.203 Accordingly, Campagne can pre-
sent strong evidence not only to contradict testimony that witnesses
for Gerawan might put forth, but also to demonstrate that a specialist
was not necessary in light of the Court’s willingness to look beyond
attorney error during oral argument.
Given the existence of these countervailing arguments, it will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Gerawan to persuade the
trial court that had Campagne’s oral argument been different, Ger-
awan and the other respondents would have prevailed in Wileman.
Therefore, Gerawan most likely will fail to prove causation and will
lose the legal malpractice suit.
IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FINDING FOR GERAWAN
The history of Campagne illustrates the difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, of proving causation with respect to an injury that allegedly oc-
curred during oral argument. First, it is difficult to identify an issue
with respect to which attorneys are not granted protection.204 Second,
the probability that the alteration of one single component of an oral
argument would change the outcome of a complex case is remote.
Wileman was litigated thoroughly in four lower federal courts.205 Over
a span of more than eight years, numerous attorneys for both the re-
spondents and the petitioners studied the issue, as did six judges and
their judicial staffs.206 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
201. Id. at 170.
202. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
203. See id. at 573-74. Former Deputy Solicitor General Stephen M. Shapiro has inter-
preted Irvis and Rose to stand for the principle that, if after completion of the oral argument,
an attorney realizes that she made an improvident concession on a point of major significance,
it may be appropriate to send a concise letter to the Justices through the Clerk. See Shapiro,
supra note 45, at 546 n.21. It is interesting to note that McConnell, who was at Mayer with
Shapiro at the time oral argument was presented, apparently did just this. One day after the
oral argument, McConnell sent a letter disavowing any concessions made by Campagne. See
McConnell Letter, supra note 91, at 1.
204. See supra pp. 131-37.
205. See supra pp. 120-24.
206. See supra pp. 120-24.
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Wileman, the Justices and their highly educated clerks researched
and contemplated the issues. The Court also received input from the
Solicitor General’s office,207 two attorneys for the respondents,208 and
numerous other groups whose opinions were documented in amicus
briefs.209 Thus, the probability that those who studied the case missed
an issue or omitted a certain characterization of an issue is minimal. 
However, the inability of Gerawan to prove causation directly
conflicts with one of the goals behind allowing recovery for legal
malpractice. Legal malpractice was instituted by the courts to: (1)
provide remedies to victims of attorney negligence; (2) force negli-
gent attorneys to bear the costs of their behavior; and (3) deter fur-
ther malpractice.210 The likely outcome of Campagne directly thwarts
the first goal because although Gerawan can most likely prove Cam-
pagne breached the appropriate standard of care, it probably cannot
recover.211
The incompatibility of a stringent causation requirement with
the goal of redressing injury from attorney negligence is not limited
to cases where the alleged negligence occurred during oral argument
before the Supreme Court. Since all legal malpractice suits require a
“trial-within-a-trial,” commentators have argued that legal malprac-
tice doctrine is flawed212 and courts should more away from the “but
for” standard in all legal malpractice cases because proof of causation
is too difficult.213
207. See supra pp. 120-24; see also Brief for the Petitioner, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) (No. 95-1184), available in 1996 WL 494305 (lisiting the Solicitor
General as the counsel of record for the petitioner).
208. See supra note 99.
209. For instance, various agricultural organizations filed amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief
Amici Curiae for the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, The National
Milk Producers Federation, and the National Cattleman’s Beef Association, Inc. in Support of
Petitioner, Wileman (No. 95-1184), available in 1996 WL 419702; Brief Amici Curiae for the
Washington Apple Commission, Idaho Potato Commission, California Kiwifruit Commission,
the Almond Alliance, California Stone Fruit Coalition and American Mushroom Institute in
Support of Petitioner, Wileman (No. 95-1184), available in 1996 WL 422143; Brief Amici Cu-
riae for Sun-Maid Growers of California in Support of Respondents, Wileman (No. 95-1184),
available in 1996 WL 554418.
210. See Tom W. Bell, Note, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice
Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1553, 1553-54 (1992).
211. See supra Part III.
212. See Erik M. Jensen, Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice
Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 666, 670 (1978) (arguing that the high causation standard, in effect,
immunizes negligent attorneys from even the most reprehensible behavior).
213. See Paul Gary Kerkorian, Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: Skirting the “Suit Within a
Suit” Requirement of Legal Malpractice Actions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1083 (1990)
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One suggestion has been to modify the “but for” causation stan-
dard to “loss of chance,” a doctrine from medical malpractice case
law.214 “Loss of chance” is applied in medical malpractice cases when
a deceased plaintiff “had a less than fifty-one percent chance of sur-
viving to a certain date at the time the misdiagnosis occurred.”215 By
definition, such plaintiffs cannot establish “but for” the negligence of
the physician they would have survived longer.216 Frequently, how-
ever, such plaintiffs can prove there was a chance of avoiding some
adverse result.217 If a plaintiff proves there was a chance to avoid the
harm, the jury is allowed to infer causation.218 Applied to legal mal-
practice, the plaintiff would only need to convince a jury that the at-
torney’s conduct diminished the chance of receiving a favorable ver-
dict.219 This is a significantly lighter burden than that imposed by the
current “but for” causation test. The loss of chance doctrine could
(discussing how commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with traditional legal malpractice
and arguing for the adoption of the principle of negligent spoliation of evidence); Develop-
ments in the Law - Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547,
1558 (1994) (suggesting that an alternative system should be developed to compensate legal
malpractice victims because litigation is too expensive and undercompensates plaintiffs);
Jensen, supra note 212, at 681 (“A restrictive ‘but for’ standard of causation has rendered the
‘client’s remedy’ no remedy at all.”); Kenneth G. Lupo, Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal
Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 690-91 (1977) (arguing that in legal malpractice cases, the
burden that the plaintiff must bear should be reduced).
214. See Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent,
72 TEX. L. REV. 369, 369-70 (1993); Jensen, supra note 212, at 679-81; Polly A. Lord, Com-
ment, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479, 1485-91 (1986). Loss of
chance has been adopted in both England and France. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice
and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 148-49 (1995). Although some
courts have interpreted Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), as replacing the “but for” ap-
proach with the lesser standard of “lost opportunity,” see Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 422 So. 2d 1109, 1114-15 (La. 1982) (Dennis, J., dissenting), recently the California Court
of Appeals for the Second District has repudiated this idea. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur
Young & Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 820, 834 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Certainly to date, no . . . approach
[other than “but for”] has been accepted by the courts.”).
In the alternative, California courts could adopt an approach similar to that of the
Ohio courts—repudiate the “but for” standard of causation but not specify the new standard.
See Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ohio 1997) (“[W]e cannot endorse a blanket propo-
sition that requires a plaintiff to prove, in every instance, that he or she would have been suc-
cessful in the underlying matter. Such a requirement would be unjust, making any recovery vir-
tually impossible for those who truly have a meritorious legal malpractice claim.”). The only
guidance provided is that the plaintiff “may be required . . . to provide some evidence of the
merits of the underlying claim.” Id.
215. See Ellis, supra note 214, at 369.
216. See id. at 369-70.
217. See Lord, supra note 214, at 1479.
218. See Jensen, supra note 212, at 680.
219. See Lord, supra note 214, at 1487 nn.53 & 55.
ENNS EXECUTIVE EDIT2.DOC 12/09/98  7:46 AM
144 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:111
provide a remedy to litigants such as Gerawan because historical data
exist that suggest a correlation between retaining a specialist and a
favorable Supreme Court outcome.220
While adopting loss of chance in the legal malpractice field
would, in some cases, allow recovery for litigants who might not re-
cover under the “but for” standard of causation, it would also have
some drawbacks. If Gerawan prevails, other litigants who receive ad-
verse decisions from the Supreme Court are likely to sue their attor-
neys. Given the comparatively small cost of filing and litigating a le-
gal malpractice action, litigants may be tempted to pursue weak
claims in hopes of significiant recovery.
Furthermore, the increased likelihood of facing a legal malprac-
tice suit, combined with an established duty to associate with or pro-
fessionally consult a specialist, may well make general practitioners
more hesitant to take Supreme Court cases in the future. This would
ultimately harm all Supreme Court litigants. As mentioned previ-
ously, the cost of retaining a specialist is already astronomical.221 If
only a limited pool of attorneys are willing to brief and argue cases
before the Court, their services could become too expensive for many
litigants, thus restricting access to the Court.
In addition, adoption of loss of chance would, in effect, necessi-
tate developing a system for predicting Supreme Court outcomes.222
Loss of chance would spawn a cottage industry of scholars and ex-
perts who would engage in arbitrary and unreliable statistical evalua-
220. See MCGUIRE, supra note 36, at 191 (concluding from his statistical analysis that ad-
vocates with prior Supreme Court experience prevail more often). Correlation, of course, does
not necessarily mean causation.  The Solicitor General, the most experienced litigator before
the Court, enjoys frequent success.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  However, the
Solicitor’s success is due more to the careful process of choosing which cases merit pursuit than
to his level of experience.  See Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical
Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 112 (1997).  In addition, “[u]nlike at-
torneys in private cases, the Solicitor General’s exercise of discretion is not subject to the de-
mands of private clients.” Id. at 113.
221. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
222. Already, some legal scholars engage in statistical analyses of past Court decisions in an
attempt to predict future decisions. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Dili-
gence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187
(1996) (using statistical analyses of the 1994 and 1995 Terms to determine the swing voter to
whom litigants should focus their arguments for the greatest impact); Paul H. Edelman & Jim
Chen, “Duel” Diligence: Second Thoughts About the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 219 (1996) (same).
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tions. In light of these considerations, the adoption of loss of chance
in the legal malpractice field would be ill-advised.223
Moreover, failing to adopt of loss of chance may not be as bad
for litigants as it initially would seem. Although maintaining the cau-
sation status quo thwarts the first goal of legal malpractice, the
unique place the United States Supreme Court holds in the legal sys-
tem has given rise to informal protections that accomplish the other
two policies underlying legal malpractice: to force negligent attorneys
to bear the costs of their behavior, and to deter further malpractice.224
Attorneys prepare assiduously because oral argument before the
Court is the “Super Bowl of American jurisprudence.”225 In effect, the
prestige that accompanies briefing a case and presenting the argu-
ment deters negligent behavior that could lead to malpractice suits.
The media watches the Supreme Court carefully and neither the legal
nor the mainstream media hesitates to publish biting critiques of at-
torneys who argue before the Court. In addition, when a case is
granted certiorari, litigants receive volumes of unsolicited informa-
tion and numerous opinions regarding the abilities of their attorneys
and the pros and cons of hiring a specialist.226 These two factors com-
bine to force attorneys to bear the cost of their behavior. Negative ar-
ticles that appear following a Supreme Court performance likely
would deter litigants from hiring the attorneys featured. Conse-
quently, such attorneys would face a decline in their business.
Moreover, if an attorney is known for a poor performance at oral ar-
gument, it is probable that the unsolicited information sent to Su-
preme Court litigants would point out such a reputation.
Although the legal system can remedy perceived defects with the
“but for” causation standard, any such remedy may cause significant
223. Furthermore, as a practical matter, California courts have rejected the adoption of loss
of chance in the field of medical malpractice. See Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593,
1609 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting loss of chance in the context of medical malpractice, in part be-
cause of the ramifications it would have on legal malpractice).
224. See Bell, supra note 210, at 1553-54 (listing the policies underlying legal malpractice).
225. Segal, supra note 45, at F12; see also Alexander Wohl, In the ‘Bigs’: Supreme Court
Appearances Are a Rare Opportunity for Small-Firm Lawyers, 81 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 46, 46
(referring to an appearance before the Supreme Court as “the World Series and the Super
Bowl rolled into one”).
226. For example, in O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), the lead attorney re-
ceived “numerous letters from D.C. firms and the surrounding area offering to do the [oral]
argument.” Coyle, supra note 53, at A1. In these solicitations, attorneys do not hesitate to dis-
cuss why they should be retained. For example, Lawrence Tribe, a recognized constitutional
scholar, once wrote to an attorney, “because of my academic reputation I hold myself to a
higher standard than ordinary advocates.” Biskupic, supra note 197, at A19.
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problems. Since some protection already exists for litigants, Califor-
nia should maintain the causation status quo.
CONCLUSION
Campagne & Assocs., Inc. v. Gerawan Farming Inc. illustrates a
problem common to all legal malpractice: causation is so difficult to
prove that litigants are likely to fail. Based on the facts of the case,
Gerawan might appear wronged. Although Gerawan specifically  re-
tained a Supreme Court specialist, its positions were presented to the
Court by an advocate whose performance the California trial court
could find substandard.
Nevertheless, Gerawan loses. First, all of the issues that Ger-
awan identified that a specialist would have argued differently fall
under the broad protections from legal malpractice granted to attor-
neys. Second, causation is extremely difficult to prove. This difficulty
is compounded because the alleged malpractice occurred during oral
argument before the Supreme Court.
At some point the ability to litigate must stop. The question is
where to draw the line. For some cases, the position of the line will be
difficult to draw. However, the facts of Campagne brings to the fore a
bright line that can be drawn: courts should not recognize a cause of
action for legal malpractice when the alleged injury occurred during
oral argument before the Supreme Court.
